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AN AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE IN KENTUCKY
In a recent Kentucky case1 action was brought against the-
owner and operator of an automobile to recover damages for
injuries to the plaintiff sustained by him while riding in the,
automobile. Defendant pleaded that plaintiff was, at the time-
of the injury, riding in his automobile as a guest. Upon de-
murrer to this plea the question as to the constitutionality of
the guest statute passed by the Kentucky Legislature in 193&>
was definitely raised. It provides, "No person transported by
the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, as his guest, without
payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action-
for damages against such owner or operator for any injuries
received, death, or any loss sustained, in case of accident, un-
less such accident shall have resulted from an intentional act
on the part of said owner or operator." The statute was held
unconstitutional. So the law in Kentucky as to the liability of
the owner or operator of an automobile for injuries to his
guest, in case of accident, is to be found solely in the judges'
interpretation of the common law as laid down in their de-
cisions.
The Kentucky court holds that the driver of an automobile-
owes to a guest the duty of exercising reasonable care in its
operation so as not to increase the hazards of travel or to create
any new dangers.2 This is in accord with the general rule as,
to the common law liability in such cases.8 In a Federal case4
L Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S. W. (2d) 347 (1932).
2 Chambers v. Hawkins, 233 Ky. 211, 25 S. W. (2d) 363 (1930);
Beard v. Elusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S. W. 319 (1914).
3Perkins v. Galloway, 194 Ala. 265, 69 So. 875 (1915); Central'
Copper Co. v. Klefiseh, 34 Ariz. 230, 270 Pac. 629 (1928); Bennett v.
Bell, 176 Ark. 690, 3 S. W. (2d) 996 (1928); Green v. Miller, 102 Fla..
767, 136 So. 532 (1931); Levy v. Leopold, 142 So. 191 (1932); Levesque-
v. Pelletier, 131 Me. 266, 161 AtI. 198 (1932); Fitzfarrel v. Boyd, 123
Md. 497, 91 At. 547 (1914); Heath v. Woleskly, 181 Minn. 492, 233
N. W. 239 (1930); Tetreauzt v. Gould, 83 N. H. 99, 138 At. 544 (1927);
Bennett v. Edwards, 239 App. Div. 157, 267 N. Y. Supp. 417 (1933);
Richards v. Warner Co., 311 Pa. 50, 166 At. 496 (1933); Leonard v.
Bartle, 48 R. I. 101, 135 AtI. 85a (1927); Tenn. C. R. Co. v. Vanhoy,.
143 Tenn. 312, 226 S. W. 225 (1920); Herold v. Clendennen, 111 W. Va.
121, 161 S. E. 21 (1931); Ganzer v. Weed, 209 Wis. 135, 244 N. W. 588z
(1932).
'Ingerick v. Mess, 63 Fed. (2d) 233 (1933).
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it was held that it was negligence, for which the guest might
recover, for the driver of the automobile to fail to warn the
guest of the bad condition of the tires. A minority, consisting
of four states, requires proof of gross negligence on the part
of the driver before a guest can recover.5 It seems that this
result is reached by analogy to the common law liability of a
gratuitous bailee.6
Statutes in nine states limit the driyer's liability to a guest
-to cases where injuries are caused by accident resulting from
the willful misconduct or gross negligence of the driver.7 Stat-
utes in ten states allow recovery to the guest only in cases where
-the accident causing the guest's injury resulted from willful or
wanton misconduct of the driver.8 A statute of this kind was
passed by the legislature of Maryland in 1931, but it was vetoed
by the governor.9
-The court in reaching the decision that the Kentucky stat-
ute was unconstitutional considered three sections of the state
constitution: Sections 241, 14, and 54. Section 241 provides,
"'Whenever the death of a person shall' result from an injury
inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then in every such case
damages may be recovered for the injury." Section 14 pro-
vides that "every person, for injury done him in his lands,
5Yearwood v. Yearwood, 45 Ga. App. 293, 164 S. E. 105 (1932);
Semons v. Towne, 188 N. E. 605 (1934); Collins v. Robinson, 169 S. E.
^690 (1933); Eubanks v. Kielsmeier, 171 Wash. 484, 18 Pac. (2d) 48
(1933).
OMasseletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 (1917); West
v. Poor, 196 Mass. 183, 81 N. E. 960 (1907).
" Sess. Laws of Colo. (1931) C. 118, p. 460; Idaho Code Ann. (1932),
,Sec. 48-901; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), Sec. 4648, Applied in Hunter v.
Baldwin, 225 N. W. 431 (1934); Mont. Laws (1931) C. 195. Applied in
Nangles v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Pac. (2d) 11 (1934); Neb. Comp.
St. Supp. (1931), Sec. 39-1129, applied in Sheely v. Abboud, 253 N. W.
683 (1934); Law of N. D. (1931) C. 148, p. 310; Ore. Code (1930),
Sec. 55-1209, applied in Monner v. Starker, V: Phc. (2d) 1109 (1934);
Sess. Laws of S. D. (1933), p. 154, C. 147; Vt. Act of 1934, No. 79,
applied in Anderson v. Olsen, 169 Atl. 781 (1934).
8 Gen. Laws of Cal. (1931), Act 5128, Sec. 141, applied In Manion
,v. Smith, 33 Pac. (2d) 418 (1934); Conn. Gen. St. (1930), Sec. 1628,
applied in Lathan v. Hanky, 117 Conn. 5, 166 Atl. 400 (1933); Cahill
Ill. Rev. St. (1933) C. 95a, Sec. 43; Iowa Code (1931), Sec. 5026-bl,
applied in Peterson v. Detwiller, 255 N. W. 529 (1934); Ind. Burns
Ann. St. Supp. (1929), Secs. 10142.1, 10142.2, applied in Coconower v.
.Stoddard, 182 N. E. 466 (1932); Kan. Rev. St. Supp. (1933), 8-122b,
applied in Sayre v. Malcom, 139 Kan. 378, 31 Pac. (2d) 8 (1934); St. of
Nev. (1933) C. 34, p. 29; Laws of Ohio (1933), p. 56, Sec. 6308-6; S. C.
-Code, Sec. 5908; Tex. Ver. Ann. Civ. St., Art. 6701b, Sec. 1, applied in
Ply v. Smink, 69 S. W. (2d) 902 (1933).
9 Laws of Maryland, 193 C. 391, p. 978.
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goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course
of law". Section 54 provides, "The General Assembly shall
have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries
resulting in death or for injuries to person or property." The-
court referring to section 54 said, "When that section is read
in connection with other sections of the same instrument, such
as sections 14, and 241, the conclusion is inescapable that the
intention of the framers of the constitution was to inhibit the-
legislature from abolishing rights of action for damages for-
death or injuries caused by negligence". It was then decided
that, since the guest statute abolished a guest's right of action
for injuries resulting from an accident caused by the driver's.
negligence, it was unconstitutional.
The court relied principally upon an Oregon case, Stewart
v. Hauk,'0 in which the Oregon court held a guest statute un-
constitutional on the ground that it took away the guest's right
of action arising from an accident caused by the driver's negli-
gence. The court held that the statute violated Art. I, Section.
10 of the Oregon Constitution which provides, "Every man
shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him
in his person, property or reputation." The court said, "The
purpose of this provision is to save from legislative abolishment
those jural rights which had become well established prior to
the enactment of our constitution." It then held that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional because it abolished a guest's right of
action for injuries caused by the driver's negligence.
On a motion for rehearing the Connecticut case, Silvers v..
Silvers," was called to the Oregon court's attention. In that
case the Connecticut Guest Statute was held constitutional and
Connecticut has a constitutional provision similar to that of
Oregon. But Connecticut's guest statute limited the driver's
liability to cases in which injuries were caused by intentional
misconduct of the driver, or his heedlessness or recklessness; and'
the Connecticut court held it only freed the host from liability'
to a guest for injuries caused by ordinary negligence.
After considering the Connecticut case the Oregon court
said, "Since the act preserved liability in instances where the-
injury was inflicted intentionally, heedlessly, or through reck-
126 Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998 (1928).
n108 Conn. 371, 143 At. 240 (1928).
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less disregard for the rights of others, and withheld liability only
to a nonpaying guest for ordinary negligence, the court reasoned
that the purpose of the act was to fix the measure of care a host
iowed to his guest-and it sustained the validity of the act."
Speaking of the fatal features of the Oregon guest statute,
the court said, "It seems to us that these identify our act, ilot
as an effort of the police power to regulate the operation of
automobiles by prescribing the duty of host to guest, but as
one wherein this element of the situation remains untouched,
.and the sole change effected, is the denial of the remedy to an
-injured guest. In our case, the act does not endeavor to re-
adjust the duty, but attempts to abolish the remedy; in the
Connecticut case, the act revised t e duty, and afforded redress
to all injured through a breach t'ereof." The court therefore
concluded that there was no conflict between its decision and the
decision of the Connecticut court.
In the following year (1929) the Oregon Legislature passed
zanother guest statute, but in that act the. guest's right of action
iq denied "unless such accident shall have been intentional on
the part of said owner or operator or caused by his gross negli-
.-gence or intoxication or his reckless disregard of the rights of
others."' 12 This statute has been applied three times since its
passage, and as far as the writer can find, its constitutionality
,has never been attacked in the court of last resort.
Oregon and Connecticut, like Kentucky, have constitutional
provisions prohibiting the legislature from abolishing rights of
action for damages for death or injuries caused by negligence.
From the cases referred to it is evident that in these two states
-the courts consider that the test, as to whether a guest statute
is constitutional or not, is, whether the statute merely regulates
the duty owed by the driver to the guest in cases of negligence,
or, abolishes the guest's right of action altogether in such cases.
If the statute provides that the guest shall have no cause of
action for damages for injuries in case of accident unless such
accident shall have resulted from an intentional act, or willful
misconduct, such a statute is unconstitutional for it abolishes the
guest's right of action altogether in cases of negligence. If on
the other hand, the statute provides that the guest shall have
no cause of action for damages for injuries, in case of accident,
12Ore. Code (1930), Sec. 55-1209.
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unless such accident shall have resulted. from an intentional or
,wrongful act or the gross negligence of the owner or operator
of an automobile, such a statute would be constitutional, for it
merely regulates the duty which the driver of an automobile
,owes to the guest and does not abolish the right of action.
The California Court has also held that a guest statute
which limits the guest's right of action to cases in which injury
,or death resulted from intoxication, willful misconduct, or gross
megligence of the host, does not take away a cause of action,
which the guest would otherwise have had, but only changes
the proof required to permit a recovery.' 8
Later when this guest statute was amended by eliminating
-gross negligence and leaving only intoxication and willful mis-
,conduct as grounds for the guest's recovery, the court still held
that it did not destroy the right of action against the host for
-wrongful death of the guest, but merely changed the nature of
-proof required. 14 The cause of action in two of the above men-
tioned California cases15 arose under a death statute which pro-
-vided a cause of action for wrongful death and the California
'Court decided that if the legislature took away the cause of
action both for ordinary negligence and gross negligence, it did
mot take away a cause of action given by the statute, but merely
changed the nature of proof required. In one of these cases
the California statute was held constitutional. 16
The Kentucky court has definitely decided that the Ken-
tucky constitution guarantees a cause of action for negligent
injury, or death, but it would seem that the legislature could
-change the nature of the proof required-or change the degree
of duty owed-and limit a guest's right of action to cases in
which the accident causing the injury results from the willful
misconduct or gross negligence of the driver.
The writer suggests the following guest statute for Ken-
tucky:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle, as his guest, without payment for such transporaton, shall
have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for
'Krause v. Parity, 210 Cal. 644, 293 Pac. 62 (1930); Castro v.
Singh, 21 Pao. (2d) 169 (1933),
'11Stotts v. Blickle, 30 Pac. (2d) 392 (1934); Forsman v. Colton,
28 Pac. (2d) 429 (1934).
'Krause v. Parity, supra, note 13; and Stotts v. Blickle, supra,
mote 14.
"Forsman v. Colton, supra, note 14.
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death, or for any injuries received, or for any loss sustained, in case
of accident, unless such accident shall have resulted from the inten-
tional misconduct or gross negligence of said owner or operator.
The suggested statute merely adds to the statute of 1930 a pro-
vision for liability in cases where the accident is the result of
"gross negligence" on the part of the driver of the automobile.
The question now arises, can the constitutionality of this
statute be supported by the Kentucky cases? The distinction
between ordinary negligence and gross negligence is recognized
in Kentucky by Section 6 of the Kentucky statutes which pro-
vides for punitive damages in case of death caused by gross
negligence. This section of the statute was passed to carry into
effect Section 241 of the Kentucky Constitution. The distinc-
tion between the degrees of negligence is pointed out in the
cases decided under this section of the statute.17 It is also
recognized in Kentucky that, while a willful act and a negligent
act are different causes of action, ordinary negligence and gross
negligence are only different degrees of the same cause of action.
This is shown by the following quotation :18
"The words 'wrongful act' of the constitution, 'and 'wilful acte
of the statute do not primarily refer to an act of negligence, which
is the opposite of those terms. The word 'gross' when used to qualify
the word 'negligence' is a relative one, and is supposed to emphasize
merely the want of due care and negligence, as 'gross' or 'ordinary'
according to the circumstances, relations, and conditions under which
the due care is omitted to be exercised."
In supporting the statute in Kentucky, the difficult problem
is the case of death caused by ordinary negligence. Section 241
of the constitution provides "Whenever the death of a l erson
shall result from an injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful
act, then, in every such case, damages may be recovered for
such death."
In Howard's Admr. v. Hunter,19 the Kentucky court, in
reference to the above section of the Constitution, said,
"It was the manifest intention of the constitutional provision
quoted to allow an action to be maintained whenever the death of a
person was caused by the negligent or wrongful act of another and
it is not within the power of the legislature to deny this right of
action. The words 'negligence' and 'wrongful act' are sufficiently broad
to embrace every degree of tort that can be committed against the
person."
1t M/lrk v. L. & N. By. Co., 101 Ky. 34, 39 S. W. 84 (1897); L. & N.
R?. Co. v. Kelley's Adm'r., 100 Ky. 421, 38 S. W. 852, 40 S. W. 452 (1897).
'"E. Tenn. Tel. Co v. ,Simms, 99 Ky 404, 36 S. W. 171 (1895);
quoted in L. & X. R. Co. v. Kelley's Adm'r., supra, note 17.
"126 Ky. 685, 104 S. W. 723, 724 (1907).
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In this case action was brought by the administrator to recover
for the death of his intestate caused by an alleged careless,
wanton, or malicious use of firearms by the defendant. Section
4 of the Kentucky statutes provides that the widow and minor
children of a person killed by careless, wanton, or malicious
use of firearms may sue for the death. The lower court sustained
a demurrer to the petition on the ground that the only cause
of action was vested in the widow and minor children. The
Court of Appeals reversed this decision, and held that the per-
sonal representative was given a cause of action by section 241
of the Constitution, and section 6 of the Statutes was passed
to carry into effect the constitutional provision. It is obvious
that the sweeping language used by the court was not necessary
for the decision. But it was quoted in the case in which the
1930 guest statute was held unconstitutional. 20 From the lan-
guage of the court and of the constitutional provision it might
appear at first blush that it would be impossible, under the Con-
stitution, for the legislature to limit liability in any case where
death has resulted to one person by the acts or omissions of
another.
It is submitted that it was never intended that such should
be the result of this constitutional provision. The provision
was only intended to be a substantial duplicate of Lord Camp-
bell's act of England, 21 which has been followed in substance
in most, if not all, of the states. "The purpose of Lord Camp-
bell's act and the various acts in this country following it was
to do away with the common law principle that a civil action
could not be maintained to recover damages for the death of a
human being". 2 2 They were "only intended to enlarge the
remedy and to allow a recovery when, under the facts, the
decedent might have recovered if he had not died". 23 It was
not intended that these acts should create a new cause of action,
independent of and more absolute than the cause of action that
would have accrued to the decedent had he lived, but rather, to
afford a new remedy in favor of the personal representative for
" Ludwig v. Johnson, supra, note 1.
2 Debates of Constitutional Convention, pages 5749-5752; Louisville
By. Co. v. Raymond's Adm'r., 135 Ky. 738, 123 S. W. 281 (1909). See
21 Ky. Law Journal 369 (1933).





substantially the same cause of action. Further evidence that
it was not intended that there should be a constitutional guar-
antee of absolute liability in every case in which the death of
one person is caused by the negligence of another is afforded
by cases holding that contributory negligence is a defence to
an action for wrongful death.2 4 To the same effect are those
cases holding that section 241 of the Constitution does not give
a right of action against a master for the death of a servant
caused by the negligence of a fellow servant,25 and those cases
holding that recovery cannot be had both for the wrongful
death and the personal injuries of the deceased. 26 Therefore
the Legislature should have the power under the Constitution
to limit liability in actions for wrongful death just as much as
it has in actions for personal injuries of the deceased.
The court, in Howard's Adm'r. v. Hunter, supra, continued
as follows:
"In Shearman & Readfield on Negligence, Section 3, 'negligence'
is thus defined: 'Negligence' constituting a cause of civil action, Is
such an omission by a responsible person to use that degree of care,
diligence and skill which it was his legal duty to use for the protection
of another person from injury, as in natural and continuous sequence
causes unintended damage to the latter. The word 'negligence' im-
plies a breach of duty and a person cannot be legally negligent so as
to subject him to damages except in respect to others to whom he owes
a duty."
From this quotation it may be seen that negligence depends upon
legal duty. The very definition itself admits that the duty may
vary with the law which defines that duty. The guest statute
which is recommended is only intended to vary the law defining
the duty owed by the driver of an automobile to his guest, and
not to remove the duty altogether. It is unfortunate that there
is no better way to state the change than to state it in terms
of "gross negligence". The statute is worded as it is, because
-'Clark v. L. & X. By. Co., 101 Ky. 34, 39 S. W. 84 (1897); Pas-
samanec v. Louisville By. Co., 98 Ky. 195, 32 S. IV 620 (1895); Arm-
strong's Adm'r. v. Sumne & Rattleman Co., 211 Ky. 750, 278 S. W. 111
(1925).
2Linck's Adm'r. v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 107 Ky. 370, 54 S. W. 184
(1899).
L. d N . Ry. Co. v. Raymond's Adm'r., 135 Ky. 738, 123 S. W. 281
(1909); Owensboro & N. Ry. Co. v. Barclay's Adm'r., 102 Ky. 16, 43
S. W. 177 (1897); Lewis' Adm'r. v. Taylor Coal Co., 112 Ky. 851, 66
S. W. 1044 (1902); C. & O. By. Co. v. Banks, 142 Ky. 746, 135 S. W. 285
(1911); for discussion of defenses to actions under See. 241 of Con-
stitution. See 21 Ky. Law Journal 369, 382.
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of the difficulty in instructing the jury under a statute worded
in any terms other than degrees of negligence. Quoting from
the same case as above, "Many wrongful acts are committed in
which there is no element of negligence-no breach of duty is
committed." The object of the suggested guest statute is to
remove from the field of legal duty owed by the driver of an
automobile to his guest, those obligations the breach of which
have heretofore been denominated ordinary negligence.
It is concluded that a statute which frees the driver of an
automobile from liability for injuries or death of a guest, in
case of accident caused by ordinary negligence on the part of
the driver, would be constitutional in Kentucky.
TTRmmIAN TODD.
